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REPLY
RESOLVING THE FLAWS OF RESIDENTIAL
SERVITUDES AND OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS:
FOR REFORMATION NOT TERMINATION
GERALD KORNGOLD*

I. INTRODUCTION

Residential developers often impose servitude schemes on tract
and high-rise developments to increase the desirability of the housing
units. These servitudes usually create common use, building and construction restrictions on the lots.I They may also grant reciprocal rights
in common facilities serving the development, such as parks, roads,
utilities and recreational amenities, and may provide for the payment
of fees by the owners to operate the facilities.2
Moreover, an increasing number of servitude regimes create an
association of the development's property owners. 3 The association is
empowered to administer the servitudes through decisions of the entire
body or subgroups (such as a board and committees),4 and functions
as a private government pursuant to authority granted by the servitudes.' The association usually administers, maintains and, in some
*

Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.

1. See, e.g., 5011 Community Org. v. Harris, 16 Conn. App. 537, 548 A.2d 9 (1988)
(residential construction only); Travis Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Small, 662 S.W.2d 406
(Tex. Ct. App. 1983) (residential uses only).
2. See, e.g., Maddox v. Katzman, 332 N.W.2d 347 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982) (granting
beach rights); Beech Mountain Property Owners' Ass'n v. Seifart, 48 N.C. App. 286, 269
S.E.2d 178 (1980) (dues covenant).
3. Some estimate that 130,000 such associations exist in the United States, governing the homes of between 12% and 15% of the population. See UNITED STATES ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS, RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIA-

SYSTEM 1, 3 (May 1989)
[hereinafter INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS].
4. Different legal devices are employed to create servitude regimes with common
areas and a private government. These include covenants, conditions and easements, which
are usually used in tract and townhouse developments, with the governing body called a
homeowners association (see Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Ass'n, 205 Mont. 221, 666 P.2d
1247 (1983)); condominiums, which create a condominium association and board (see Berger,
Condominium:Shelter on a Statutory Foundation,63 COLUM. L. REV. 987 (1963); N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW §§ 339-d to 339-ii (McKinney 1989)); and cooperatives, which are usually organized as a corporation with a board of directors (see Youman, Some Legal Aspects of
CooperativeHousing, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 126 (1947)). While these forms vary, they
share common doctrinal and policy issues relating to servitude enforcement and the use of
private governments.
5. See Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survery, 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (1976).
TIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS

IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
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cases, holds title to the common areas.6 An association may also exercise discretionary power over matters related to the servitudes, set

rules and regulations pursuant to power granted in the servitudes, enforce violations, provide other services such as trash collection and
security, and collect and disburse subdivision dues in connection with
these activities.7 The package of rights and duties of the owners and
the association differs from development to development, based on the
servitude provisions imposed by the developer.

Commentators have discussed the benefits and disadvantages of
servitudes and private residential governments. 8 Many argue that the
law should treat servitudes like contracts, validating and enforcing them

if the parties' intentions are clear. These commentators also suggest
that the intrusion of classic doctrines of easement, covenant and condition law on these consensual arrangements should be limited.9 I have
6. See, e.g., Neponsit Property Owners Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 278
N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938) (association administering common areas).
7. See, e.g., Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Ass'n, 205 Mont. 221, 666 P.2d 1247 (1983)
(rules and regulations power); Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates Property Owners Ass'n, 90
N.C. App. 40, 367 S.E.2d 401 (1988), affd, 324 N.C. 80, 375 S.E.2d 905 (1989) (power to
approve building plans); Perry v. Bridgetown Community Ass'n, 486 So. 2d 1230 (Miss. 1986)
(subdivision dues); Garrison Apartments, Inc. v. Saourin, 113 Misc. 2d 674, 449 N.Y.S.2d
629 (Civ. Ct. 1982) (providing security).
8. See, e.g., Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, andthe Law ofServitudes, 73 CORNELL
L. REv. 883 (1988); C. Berger, Some Reflections on a Unified Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1323 (1982); L. Berger, Integration of the Law of Easements, Real Covenants and
EquitableServitudes, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 337 (1986); Browder, Running Covenants and
Public Policy, 77 MICH. L. REV. 12 (1978); Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants,
Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973); Epstein,
Covenants and Constitutions,73 CORNELL L. REv. 906 (1988); Epstein, Notice and Freedom
of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353 (1982) [hereinafter Epstein,
Notice and Freedom]; French, Servitudes Reform and the New Restatement of Property: Creation Doctrines and Structural Simplification, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 928 (1988); French,
Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1261 (1982) [hereinafter French, Modern Law of Servitudes]; French, Design Proposalfor the
New Restatement of the Law of Property-Servitudes,21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1213 (1988)
[hereinafter French, Design Proposal];McDougal, Land-Use Planningby Private Volition: A
Frameworkfor Policy-OrientedInquiry, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1974); Newman & Losey, CovenantsRunning with the Land,and EquitableServitudes: Two Concepts,or One?, 21 HASTINGS
L.J. 1319 (1970); Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.
1177 (1982); Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments on Professors French
and Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403 (1982); Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes,
73 CORNELL L. REV. 956 (1988); Sterk, Freedomfrom Freedom of Contract: The Enduring
Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IowA L. REV. 615 (1985).
9. See C. Berger, supra note 8, at 1329 ("Unification theory clearly accords the
intent of the parties a dominant position in the interpretation of agreements"); Epstein, Notice
and Freedom, supra note 8, at 1358; Ellickson, supra note 8, at 713-24; French, Modern Law
of Servitudes,supra note 8, at 1305 ("Agreements creating servitudes can be treated like other
agreements: if the agreement itself is valid, the law should give effect to the parties' intentions,
enforcing the agreement until it becomes obsolete or unreasonably burdensome."); McDougal,
supra note 8, at 1-2; Reichman, supra note 8, at 1184; Reichman, supra, note 5, at 277.
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argued, however, that although this contract-based policy is valid and
must be effectuated, decision makers must balance freedom of c6ntract
notions against other important policies. 10 I have suggested that to
protect other societal goals, such as efficient allocation of land and
democratic participation in local land use decisions, and to guard future
owners' individual autonomy, enforcement of servitudes should be denied in certain circumstances.
In his recent article in the Wisconsin Law Review, Professor James
Winokur advances the dialogue on several levels.'I Significantly, he
focuses the debate by examining servitudes in the context of apparent
increases in disputes and owner dissatisfaction within subdivision developments. He analyzes the costs and benefits of servitudes, and maintains, among his other observations, that servitudes may not be economically efficient and that they decrease personal autonomy. To
address these problems, Professor Winokur suggests a number of
changes in the substantive law of servitudes. His central recommendation is that, as a matter of law, negative servitudes should not be
enforceable beyond twenty years; he would instead allow the covenants
to continue if the parcels entitled to enforce after twenty years numbered ten or fewer.' 2 Professor Winokur's analysis and proposals diverge from the contract model extolled by other commentators.
I have a different perspective. I believe that Professor Winokur
does not sufficiently recognize and protect the contract benefits inuring
from servitude enforcement (just as I have maintained that other com10. See Korngold, Single Family Use Covenants: ForAchieving A Balance Between
TraditionalFamily Life and Individual Autonomy, 22 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 951 (1989) [hereinafter Korngold, Single Family Covenants]; Korngold, For Unifying Servitudes and Defeasible Fees: PropertyLaw's FunctionalEquivalents, 66 TEX. L. REV. 533 (1988) [hereinafter
Korngold, Servitudes and DefeasibleFees]; Korngold, Privately Held ConservationServitudes:
A Policy Analysis in the Context ofIn Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV.
433 (1984) [hereafter Korngold, Conservation Servitudes]; see also G. KORNGOLD, PRIVATE
LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES

254-62 (1990).
11. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward Optimizing

Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and PersonalIdentity, 1989 Wis. L.

REV.

1. Professor

Winokur includes much analysis and many proposals. I focus on only some aspects.
12. Winokur, supra note 11, at 79. He refers to these smaller units as "pods."

Professor Winokur proposes that monetary obligations for supporting common facilities should not be subject to the 20-year termination rule, on the theory that there has not
been great dissatisfaction with these covenants and that, otherwise, facilities would deteriorate

or some owners would have to bear an inequitable portion of the costs. See id. at 83. I do
not find the distinction between restrictive and money (i.e., affirmative) covenants to be
persuasive. These money covenants can also become oppressive to owners over time, as
facilities wear out and new funds (above reserves) are required for substantial repairs. Moreover, especially as time passes, if no cap exists on the amounts that can be charged under
such clauses, buyers may be dissuaded from purchasing in the subdivision; this may decrease
the land's marketability. We need to craft solutions for the specific problems connected with
negative and affirmative covenants instead of applying an automatic termination rule.

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
mentators ignore important societal and personal values which require
that, iii some cases, servitudes should not be rigorously enforced). Like
Professor Winokur, I believe that the theoretical issues and empirical
experience of servitude enforcement by residential community associations raise many important concerns. However, the disputes and
dissatisfaction within private residential governments do not surprise
me in light of the family home's importance in our society and our
experience with strong emotions in the public land use regulation arena.
These difficulties do not not require terminating servitudes as a matter
of law at a fixed point-in most cases this would just mean losing a
still viable and valuable servitude regime and private government. In
addition, forced termination would not solve the problems that arise
during the initial twenty-year period or after that point in the "pods." 1 3
I believe that the contract benefits of servitudes require their continued enforcement in most cases. We must recognize, however, the
problems and competing policy values inherent in servitude enforcement, especially when administered by private governments. We must
then develop doctrines which strike the proper balance between contract benefits, individual autonomy and societal flexibility. We can
reach a proper accomodation of these competing values by addressing
three issues. 14 First, the law must identify and enforce appropriate
limitations on the subject matter of servitudes. Second, we must articulate doctrines requiring equal treatment of individual owners, procedural fairness in association decision making, and rational exercise
of discretionary power by the association. Third, we must explore alternate methods for resolving disputes between the private government
and its citizens. I will describe why these issues are important and
indicate how we might begin to resolve them.
II. BENEFITS OF SERVITUDES AND PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS
Although servitudes differ from bilateral contracts in many respects, 15 contracts and servitudes are both devices to effectuate private
consensual arrangements. Servitudes should be enforced like other con13. See supra note 12. I have several other concerns with Professor Winokur's pod
concept. It adds complexity to the servitude arrangement, even though he finds that current
servitudes are already difficult for many purchasers to comprehend. Winokur, supra note I1,
at 30. Also, pods of 10 or less lots seem to cover too small a geographical area to keep out
harmful spillovers from beyond the pod's border. Moreover, the pod system would atomize
the initial private government, with resulting losses of efficiencies of scale.
14. Other important issues include the changed conditions doctrine and termination
and modification rules. See French, Modern Law ofServitudes, supra note 8, at 1313; Korngold, Servitudes and Defeasible Fees, supra note 10, at 557-58; see also G. KORNOOLD, supra
note 10, at 381-424.
15. See Korngold, Conservation Servitudes, supra note 10, at 448-50.
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tracts for several reasons: efficiency, moral obligation and freedom of
choice.1 6 Moreover, flexibility and democratic self-control may be
added benefits from reciprocal subdivision covenants and private governments. A twenty-year limitation imposed by law would deny these
advantages.
A. Efficiency
Servitudes permit the transfer of nonpossessory rights in land. This
increases the efficient allocation of land, since by using servitudes, people do not have to acquire more rights in land than they actually want.
To prevent a neighbor from building a factory, for example, one need
not buy the fee but can purchase a restriction. Moreover, the owner
can liquidate a portion of her interest by selling a servitude, while
retaining productive use of the property subject to the servitude. The
law should encourage people to enter such efficiency-maximizing transactions by enforcing them without undue transaction costs.1 7
A servitude regime creating reciprocal burdens and benefits among
the owners may also bring additional efficiency gains. Although a specific parcel loses value when it is burdened by covenants, the loss may
be offset by the benefits of identical restrictions binding neighboring
lots, which create a valuable residential community. 18 Moreover, developers can use servitudes to provide common facilities that individual owners could not afford.19
Reserving open space as a common amenity not only brings aesthetic benefits but also can lessen the developer's cost under planned
unit development (PUD) zoning.20 Additionally, when a homeowners
association administers the facilities, the developer can avoid the expenses necessary to meet standards for dedication to local government.2 ' These savings and efficiencies can be passed on to residential
consumers.
16. See id. at 450-54; Korngold, Single Family Covenants, supra note 10, at 95862; Korngold, Servitudes and Defeasible Fees, supra note 10, at 539-42.
17. See Ellickson, supra note 8, at 713-14; Korngold, Servitudes and DefeasibleFees,
supra note 10, at 541-42; Reichman, supra note 8, at 1231, 1234.
18. For courts recognizing the efficiency of servitudes in subdivisions, see Adult
Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459, 464 (Ind. App. 1987) (enhance value of
benefited land); Rofe v. Robinson, 415 Mich. 345, 349, 329 N.W.2d 704, 707 (1982) (valuable
"property rights").
19. Professor Winokur would not subject covenants to pay for common areas, and
presumably the affirmative right to use the areas, to a 20-year termination rule. See supra
note 12.
20. See Findings,in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 4. For a
discussion of planned unit development, see Symposium, Planned Unit Development, 114
U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1965).
21. Findings,in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 4; RCR Characteristicsand Issues, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 10.
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Professor Winokur, however, claims that servitude regimes create
inefficiencies. He argues that free market analysis is inappropriate in
many servitude cases, and that there are reasons to doubt whether a
true consensual transaction existed.2 2 For example, the complexity of
the servitude documents prevents buyers from having notice of the
restrictions, 23 and substantive limitations on alteration of servitudes
and the number of parties entitled to enforce them make it unlikely
that a purchaser can negotiate changes before buying.4 Servitudes may
also become obsolete, and holdouts may prevent consensual modifi25
cations.
Some of these issues are certainly significant. 26 I believe, though,
that servitudes' overall efficiencies and benefits outweigh their problems. The inefficiencies which Professor Winokur notes deserve attention but should be addressed with specific solutions, rather than with
a rule requiring termination after twenty years. Consider, for example,
the problems of notice and obsolescence. First, the recording acts can
be enforced strictly, and rules of inquiry notice can be interpreted
closely to prevent a purchaser without notice from being bound by a
servitude.27 Consumer protection laws and the emerging rule of disclosure in real estate transactions might be used to control nondisclo28
sure of servitudes by developers, selling unit owners and associations.
In a rare case, monopoly analysis may be appropriate, although no
evidence shows that current use of servitudes has reached that point.
If, however, all we have is a buyer who simply does not read a servitude
or employ an attorney to do so before buying, the servitude arrangement should not be disturbed. The other owners have relied on the
transaction, and great market disruptions would occur if the law positively reinforced people who chose to act unreasonably or even foolishly.
Obsolescence of servitudes can be addressed with the "changed
conditions" doctrine and a clearly articulated doctrine barring enforcement of covenants that violate public policy. 29 Additionally, holdouts
22. See Winokur, supra note 11, at 28-29.
23. Id. at. 30.
24. Id. at 33.
25. Id. at 34.
26. See Korngold, Single Family Covenants, supra note 10; Korngold, Servitudes
and Defeasible Fees, supra note 10; Korngold, Conservation Servitudes, supra note 10.
27. For example, courts might limit the scope of the chain of title (and so limit
constructive notice). See, e.g., Buffalo Academy of the Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., Inc.,
267 N.Y. 242, 196 N.E. 42 (1935) (covenants burdening lot in question which appeared in
deeds conveying other lots are not within chain of title); contra Bishop v. Rueff, 619 S.W.2d
718 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981). On limiting the chain of title, see Philbrick, Limits ofRecord Search
and Therefore of Notice, 93 U. PA. L. REV. 125, 174 (1944).
28. See Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885 (W. Va. 1982) (requiring disclosure of

material, hidden defects); Condominium and Cooperative Conversion Protection and Abuse
Relief Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3616 (1988) (regulating substantive provisions of condominium
and cooperative conversions).
29. See French, Modern Law of Servitudes, supra note 8, at 1300-02 (changed con-
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can be reduced by including provisions that allow termination
and
30
consent.
less-than-unanimous
with
servitudes
of
modification
While I believe that servitudes usually increase land's efficient use,
efficiency gains should not be the sole criterion for determining whether
a specific servitude should be enforced. Rather, these benefits must be
weighed against competing social policies.3 '
B. Moral Obligation
Courts have concluded that servitudes should be enforced for
moral considerations. Courts do not want an original covenantor to
pay a reduced price for land subject to a servitude, and then sell it free
of the restriction for a higher price. 32 Moreover, since a buyer can
protect himself by reducing the land's price to reflect the burden of
existing servitudes, he should not be permitted to avoid the obligation
and deprive the benefited owners of the value of the servitudes. 33 If,

however, all buyers have notice of a twenty year limit on servitudes,
it would not be "immoral" if those servitudes were not enforced after
that point.
C. Freedom of Choice
Servitudes represent the parties' voluntary choice. They allow individuals to create an environment that they believe will maximize
their self-fulfillment. In residential servitude regimes, an owner receives
increased "health, happiness, and peace of mind" in exchange for accepting community
restrictions and power. 34 The servitudes provide
35
"character," "integrity and tranquility" 36 for the neighborhood. Serditions); Korngold, Single Family Covenants, supra note 10, at 978-79 (urging increased
development and use of doctrine voiding covenants that violate publice policy); Korngold,
Servitudes and Defeasible Fees, supra note 10, at 557-58 (changed conditions); Korngold,
Conservation Servitudes, supra note 10, at 484-86 (changed conditions); Reichman, supra
note 8, at 1259.
30. See infra note 41.
31. See Korngold, Single Family Covenants, supra note 10, at 959-60; Korngold,
Conservation Servitudes, supra note 10, at 453-54.
32. See, e.g., Bill Wolf Petroleum Corp. v. Chock Full of Power Gasoline Corp., 41
A.D.2d 950, 344 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1973); Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774, 778, 41 Eng. Rep.
1143, 1144 (Ch. 1848) ("nothing could be more inequitable than that the original purchaser
should be able to sell the property the next day for a greater price").
33. See, e.g., Franklin v. White Egret Condominium, 358 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. App.
1977), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 1979); Welitoffv. Kohl, 105 N.J. Eq. 181, 187-88, 147 A.
390, 393 (1929) ("it would be unfair to permit one who bought presumably at a lower price
because of the imposed restrictive covenant, to make a profit by selling at a higher price clear
of the restriction"); Kiernan v. Snowden, 123 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (Sup. Ct. 1953) ("in reliance
upon the protection of the covenants, established their residences in the locality").
34. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975); see RCA Characteristics and Issues, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note
3, at 10 (describing consumer preference for servitude regimes).
35. See Jackson v. Williams, 714 P.2d 1017, 1024 (Okla. 1985).
36. Gregory v. State, 495 A.2d 997 (R.I. 1985).
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vitude regimes and residential community associations also provide
desired common facilities as well as a means to administer them.37
These covenants were relied upon by the purchasers and so should
be enforced by the courts.38 In the usual case, one noncomplying owner
should not be permitted to deprive unilaterally the other owners of
their personal satisfaction. In order to foster free choice, therefore,
courts should enforce servitudes as a general matter. In some special
cases, however, where the choices of one person preempt another from
having free choice, the law may have to strike a balance.
D. Private Residential Governments
Reciprocal servitude regimes and private residential governments
can provide additional benefits to the owners. 39 Flexibility, compromise and community autonomy may be increased in several ways. First,
when covenants are reciprocal, owners may be willing to compromise
to resolve questions relating to covenant violations and enforcement
because of the social norm of cooperation between neighbors. 40 Furthermore, because all owners have the same benefits and burdens, an
owner seeking to violate the covenant may be dissuaded from doing
so upon realizing that her property would be devalued if her neighbors
also breached the covenant; similarly, an owner enforcing a restriction
may be willing to be flexible since she may seek a similar accommodation in the future. We should not forget, when looking at the situations where cooperation fails, that there are many instances where it
succeeds.
When the servitude scheme can be modified and terminated by a
less-than-unanimous vote of the owners, obsolete, inefficient and oppresssive servitudes can be removed more easily. 4' Such provisions
prevent a small number of holdouts from blocking changes necessary
to meet new conditions and needs of the community and to eliminate
37. See RCA Characteristicsand Issues, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra
note 3, at 10.
38. See Adult Group Properties, Ltd. v. Imler, 505 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987);
Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980) (dissenting opinion).
39. The courts have stated that subdivision schemes deserve special protection. See,
e.g., Lake St. Louis Community Ass'n v. Kamper, 503 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973);
Town & County Estates v. Slater, 227 Mont. 489, 740 P.2d 668 (1987).
40. See Romans v. Nadler, 217 Minn. 174, 14 N.W.2d 482 (1944); Hassinger v.
Kline, 91 A.D.2d 988, 457 N.Y.S.2d 847 (N.Y. 1983).
41. See, e.g., Jaskiewicz v. Walton, 77 Md. App. 170, 549 A.2d 774 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1988) (amendment by a majority of owners); Sanderson v. Hidden Valley Fishing Club,
743 S.W.2d 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (amendment by two-thirds of owners); Smith v. Butler
Mountain Estates Property Owners Ass'n, Inc., 324 N.C. 80, 375 S.E.2d 905 (1989) (termination by two-thirds of owners). See G. KORNGOLD, supra note 10, at 386-90, 419-24.

1990:513

Resolving the Flaws of Residential Servitudes

521

burdensome ties on land.4 2 Thus, major land use issues affecting the
community can be resolved through a democratic process.
Additional benefits arise when an association or designated body
enforces servitudes and exercises discretionary powers.43 No matter
how fine the drafter, he cannot foresee all issues that the subdivision

may face. By giving a degree of discretion to a governing body, there
can be flexibility in the scheme's administration and enforcement.
Moreover, some controls, such as aesthetic restrictions or dues covenants, require continuing administration and decision making. These
democratically constituted groups can make choices within the guidelines of the servitude documents, and so achieve the community's goals.
A lone holdout cannot veto community action.
Administrative efficiencies also result when decision making is
delegated to private government. This arrangement prevents duplicative enforcement actions by individual owners, reduces transaction
costs in the negotiation process, relieves the burden of obtaining con-

sent from all owners, and may allow the community to take advantage
of its members' expertise.
Servitude administration by associations, though, can be harmful
when individual owners are unfairly affected by decisions. Nonetheless,
we need to address these abuses, as I suggest below, without crippling
the association structure and the benefits it brings.
Professor Winokur maintains that "the anticipated advantages of
participatory democracy... have not materialized sufficiently to offset
the limitations on individual autonomy inherent in multilateral promissory relationships."'4 4 He believes there is increased owner dissatisfaction with servitude regimes and cites low attendance at association
meetings, dissension within associations, occasional violent confrontations between neighbors, and increased litigation involving association life.4 5
I have a different reaction to these phenomena. First, the data
might be interpreted differently. Low owner attendance at meetings
may simply show that people are satisfied with how the association is
42. Contrast this with Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension v. Sahlem,
254 N.Y. 161, 172 N.E. 455 (1930) (all owners but one in a 128 lot development consented
to a modification of the covenants to allow the erection of a church).
43. See, e.g., Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Ass'n, 205 Mont. 221, 666 P.2d 1247 (1983)
(power to regulate nuisances); Coral Gables Investments, Inc. v. Graham Co., 528 So. 2d
989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (aesthetic regulation); Rodruck v. Sand Point Maintenance
Comm'n, 48 Wash. 2d 565, 295 P.2d 714 (1956) (power to set subdivision assessments).
44. See Winokur, supranote 11, at 62. For other discussion of the lack of democracy
in private residential governments, see Reichman, supra note 5, at 267-75; see also Ellickson,
Cities and HomeownersAssociations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982); Michaelman, Universal
Suffrage: A Liberal Defense, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1581 (1982); Frug, Cities and Homeowners
Association: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589 (1982).
45. See Winokur, supra note 11, at 62-64.
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functioning. I do not find low participation that surprising or troubling
compared to low voter turnout in public local elections and small citizen participation in local government issues.4 6 Additionally, increased
association litigation not only may reflect the general increase in litigation over the period, but may also result from the expanded number
of servitude regimes over recent years.4 7
Moreover, I believe that dissension within a subdivision scheme
is to be expected and may even be beneficial. Both zoning and private
government administration of servitudes involve a tension between
private property rights and communal regulation, as well as a battle
between differing visions of the group's land use goals. 4 Our experience
with zoning shows how local land issues often trigger deep feelings and
conflict among affected citizens. 49 This emotion and discord are real
and cannot be wished away. The conflict may even form a valuable
dialectic for evolving community land use polices. Much of zoning law
focuses on developing a decision-making process that is fair to all parties and also allows dissent to be expressed. 5° If this were achieved,
even the losers in the process might recognize the legitimacy of the
ultimate decision.
Furthermore, disputes in residential private governments are not
surprising since the family home-an important value in our
culture- 5 is at stake. The potential for conflict is heightened because
46.

For example, based on statistics compiled by the Cuyahoga County (Ohio) Board

of Elections, in a closely fought mayoral election in Cleveland in November, 1989, only 53.5%
of registered voters cast ballots (160,433 out of 299,740). In the City of Cleveland Heights,
only 32.6% of registered voters cast ballots in that local election (11,047 out of 33,866). These
statistics do not include people who were not even registered to vote.
47. See Winokur, supra note 1I,at 64, n.264.
48. Compare Barton & Silverman, The PoliticalLife of Mandatory Homeowners'
Associations, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 31 (describing tension
in association situation) with R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 93-104 (1985) (discussing conflict with governmental regulation).
49. See Krasnowiecki, Abolish Zoning, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 719 (1980).

50. See Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, II Cal.
3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974) (requiring findings to support variance decisions); Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973) (finding that
some decisions are quasi-judicial requiring increased judicial review); City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (determining appropriate scope of voter ratification of zoning changes); see also Brownstein, Illicit Legislative Motive in the Municipal
Land Use Regulation Process, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. I (1988).
51. See Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980) (dissenting
opinion) ("a home, 'The American Dream' "); Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension
v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161. 172 N.E. 455 (1930) ("Rightly or wrongly he believes that the
comfort of his dwelling will be imperiled."); Mechem, The Peasant in His Cottage: Some
Comments on the Relative HardshipDoctrine of Equity, 28 S. CAL. L. REV. 139, 144 (1955)
("the basic concept that private ownership of a dwelling house is still the most inviolable of
all property rights"); M. GORDON, THE AMERICAN FAMILY: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
66-68 (1978) (discussing American family home as a private refuge).
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of the parties' proximity to each other. 52 The goal in servitudes regimes,
therefore, should not be to eliminate all conflicts. Rather, we need to
provide a process that resolves the conflicts which do arise in a legitimate, fair, democratic and efficient manner.
Servitudes and private residential governments, therefore, provide
various benefits. The law should, in the usual case, validate and enforce
such consensual arrangements. At the same time, however, servitudes
and residential associations have the potential of exacting unacceptable
costs on individual freedom and rights and community action. As I
will develop in the next section, the law must develop specific responses
to these problems. Terminating servitudes as a matter of law at a fixed
point is an overreaction to the potential negative fallout of servitudes.
Moreover, such an approach does not address the problems that need
to be resolved before the termination date arrives.
III. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL FLAWS OF SERVITUDE REGIMES

Despite their benefits, servitudes and private governments can offend important policy considerations and have a deleterious effect on
the goals of society and individual owners. This section will explore
two areas in which such concerns arise-the permissible subject matter
of servitudes and private government administration of servitudesand suggest how these harms can be prevented while maintaining the
general principle of servitude enforceability. Additionally, this section
will consider alternate means to resolving disputes within residential
community associations.
A. Subject Matter of Servitudes
1. THE PROBLEM AND SUGGESTED APPROACH

In servitude cases, some courts refer to a policy of free and unrestricted use of land53 or a policy against restraints on alienability.54
52. See generally Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 55
(1987).
53. See, e.g., Marion Road Ass'n v. Harlow, I Conn. App. 329, 472 A.2d 785 (1984);
DeMund v. Lum, 5 Haw. App. 336, 690 P.2d 1316 (1984); Blevins v. Barry-Lawrence County
Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 707 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. 1986).
54. See, e.g., Eagle Enters. v. Gross, 39 N.Y.2d 505, 384 N.Y.S.2d 717, 349 N.E.2d
816 (1976); Cain v. Powers, 100 N.M. 184, 668 P.2d 300 (1983).
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I refer to it as the "antirestrictions policy." 5 Although the courts do
not explain the policy clearly, I believe that its central concern is limiting control of the dead hand. 6 This antirestrictions policy must be
balanced against the freedom of contract and subdivision benefits of
servitudes.
Covenants permit control by the dead hand since they bind not
only the original purchaser but also future owners, perhaps in perpetuity. This may impose serious costs for two reasons. First, current
owners are prevented from changing the use of their land to meet
current needs of society as reflected in the marketplace. This may frustrate efficient use of our limited supply of land. 57 Second, judicial enforcement of a servitude effectuates the vision of a previous generation,
which may thwart the aspirations and personal autonomy of the current
owner. Especially in a time of decreasing opportunities-such as access
to housing-imposing the wishes of past generations on the present
owner may be especially disrupting. We must take care that in enforcing
servitudes to achieve communal goals that we do not ignore our society's vision of the family home as a private refuge from the larger
world.58
Although virtually every restriction limits the current owner's personal autonomy, this does not mean that all servitudes should be unenforceable or that dead hand concerns require that all subdivision servitudes should be voided after twenty years. Rather, a balance must
be struck between the antirestrictions policy and the contract and communal benefits of servitudes in developing rules that limit restrictions
within servitude regimes. In order to accommodate these competing
interests, a restriction should be enforced only to the extent that it
regulates the owner's external behavior (measured by objective criteria)
rather than her status or private conduct. Courts should, therefore,
uphold restrictions that control harmful spillovers on the subdivision
that arise from an owner's use of her property (e.g., excessive noise or
55. See Korngold, Single Family Covenants, supra note 10, at 962-69; Korngold,
Servitudes and Defeasible Fees, supra note 10, at 542-46; Korngold, Conservation Servitudes,
supra note 10, at 455-57.
Related to the antirestrictions policy are the courts' declarations that covenants are not
favored by the law. See, e.g., Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. Connecticut Packing Co., 732
F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1984); Frander & Frander, Inc. v. Griffen, 457 So. 2d 375 (Ala. 1984);
Marks v. Wingfield, 229 Va. 573, 331 S.E.2d 463 (1985).
56. Marketability concerns are usually not important with reciprocal subdivision
covenants. See Korngold, Single Family Covenants, supra note 10, at 962-69; Korngold,
Servitudes and Defeasible Fees, supra note 10, at 542-46; Korngold, Conservation Servitudes,
supra note 10, at 455-57. But see supra note 12 (indicating possible marketability problems
with dues covenants).
57. See Copelan v. Acree Oil Co., 249 Ga. 276, 290 S.E.2d 94 (1982). The changed
conditions doctrine attempts to respond to this concern by voiding obsolete covenants. See
supra note 14 and accompanying text.
58. On the role of the family home, see M. GORDON, supra note 51, at 66-68; see
generally Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1135 (1985).
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traffic), but should not enforce controls on personal choices within a
home. Under this rule, not only would the neighborhood's integrity be
protected, which would preserve contractual and communal benefits,
but also past generations' values would not be imposed on present
owners.
This rule would prohibit, for example, enforcing a subdivision
59
servitude limiting occupancy of a residence to a "traditional" family.
Such covenants attempt to control behavior within the home that does
not directly affect the neighborhood.6 ° My proposed rule would also
have barred prior enforcement of racial covenants. 61 Professor Winokur objects to servitudes regulating aesthetics as
severely regiment[ing] conduct in one's immediate home environment. Respect for, and promotion of, individual identity
requires protection of each resident's right, for example, to
determine when he or she takes out the trash, to select the
color of the family swing set, to fly the American (or other)
flag from the balcony, to choose his or her own interior curtains and liners, and to decide how many sixteenths of an
inch thick the plexiglass shall be on a balcony enclosure.62
This position undervalues the contract and communal benefits of
servitudes and goes too far in protecting the individual owner. Indeed,
it is hard to think of a restriction that would not impermissibly offend
Professor Winokur's view of individual identity.
Under my proposed rule, I would reach a different result on most
of the examples which Professor Winokur gives. Servitudes should be
valid to the extent that they control harmful spill overs from individual
owners. Thus, the community should be able to enforce covenants that
regulate external aesthetic features, which can harm neighborhood ambience and property values. 63 It should also be permitted to use cov59. See, e.g., London v. Handicapped Facilities Bd., 637 S.W.2d 212 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982) (group home for the handicappped); Feely v Birenbaum, 554 S.W.2d 432 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1977) (two male co-owners); Omega Corp. v. Malloy, 228 Va. 12, 319 S.E.2d 728 (1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985) (group home for the handicapped); see also Korngold,
Single Family Covenants, supra note 10, at 967.
60. Nonenforcement would, however, prevent the creation of a certain "moral ambience" in the neighborhood. See Michaelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145,
194 (1977-78). That cost is acceptable. Korngold, Single Family Covenants, supra note 10,
at 967.
61. Enforcement of such covenants was barred by an expansive use of state action.
See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See G. KORNGOLD, supra note 10, at 351.
The inability of the law of servitudes to deal with such covenants serves as a painful reminder
for the need to develop doctrines denying enforcement of covenants intruding on the privacy
of the home.
62. See Winokur, supra note 11, at 74.
63. See Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 168 Colo. 6, 449 P.2d 361 (1969); Town
& Country Estates Ass'n v. Slater, 227 Mont. 489, 740 P.2d 668 (1987); Palmetto Dunes
Resort v. Brown, 287 S.C. 1, 336 S.E.2d 15 (Ct. App. 1985).
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enants to prevent threats to common health and safety (likely goals of
trash and glass regulations). With the possible exception of the flag
flying restriction,6 4 there is no unacceptable imposition of the wishes
and values of past generations on current owners. 65 Our society accepts
public regulation of these same activities, despite the inherent limitations on personal action, because of the offsetting benefits to the larger
community. 66 Such restrictions should be tolerated in servitudes, as
long as they are fairly administered by the association. 6 7 If an owner
does not like these restrictions, she should not buy a home in the
community in the first place or, if she did, she should sell and leave.
She should not, however, be permitted to devalue the scheme for the

rest of the owners. The burdens of a subdivision arrangement are not
for everyone (despite the corresponding benefits); some people might

be happier living on unrestricted land.
2.

IMPLEMENTING THE SOLUTION

The courts can limit the subject matter of covenants in various
ways. First, the touch and concern test, a traditional tool for controlling
the types of permissible covenants, can be clarified to permit only servitudes that control land utilization. 68 Servitudes imposing "ideologically prescribed modes of behavior" would not be enforced. 69 The
touch and concern test as currently conceptualized needs reworking
since it does not squarely confront important policy issues. Instead,
the test employs an arcane framework in rendering decisions. A reformulated touch and concern test, or a substitute doctrine limiting subject
64. See Gerber v. Longboat Harbor N. Condominium, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 884 (M.D.
Fla. 1989) (finding state action in condominium rule against flag flying). Even without use
of state action, the importance of self-expression may require judicial limits on such rules
even though the action causes communal fallout.
65. I assume that the window treatments to which Professor Winokur refers are
visible outside of the house.
66. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (aesthetic regulation of billboards); State ex rel. Stoyanoff v. Berkeley, 458 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. 1970) (public
architectural review).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 75-103.
68. See Korngold, Single Family Covenants, supra note 10, at 977; Reichman, Judicial Supervision of Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 150 (1978). For formulations of the
touch and concern test, see Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Mayor & City Council
of Baltimore, 308 Md. 627, 521 A.2d 734 (1987); Albright v. Fish, 136 Vt. 387, 394 A.2d
1117 (1978); Feider v. Feider, 40 Wash. App. 589, 699 P.2d 801 (1985); C. CLARK, REAL
COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 99 (2d ed. 1947); Bigelow,
The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MICH. L. REV. 639, 644-45 (1913-14). Some commentators have recently questioned the need for the touch and concern requirement. See,
e.g., Epstein, Notice and Freedom, supra note 8, at 1360 (objecting to touch and concern as
intrusion on free choice); French, Design Proposal,supra note 8, at 1220 n. 18 (cases); French,
Modern Law of Servitudes, supra note 8, at 1308 (preferring increased use of modification
doctrines).
69. Reichman, supra note 8, at 1233.
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matter of covenants, can effectively balance the benefits and costs of
70
servitudes.
Second, courts often declare that covenants violating public policy
are not enforceable. 7 ' While most of these cases lack significant policy
analysis, 72 courts could better articulate and employ that doctrine to
void covenants permitting inappropriate dead hand power. Similarly,
some legislatures and courts have barred specific enforcement of covenants when the public interest would not be served."
Finally, a modem law of servitudes could articulate clear controls
on subject matter that reflect the accommodation of the costs and benefits of servitudes which I outlined above. Perhaps the Restatement
(Third)of Property-Servitudescould include such issues in sections on
subject matter and covenants violating public policy.
Professor Winokur finds that such "[i]nherently unpredictable discretionary doctrines are to be avoided or, where substantially important
..,circumscribed to the degree possible." 74 However, if these doctrines
limiting subject matter are clearly articulated and applied by the courts
in the ways I have suggested, greater predictability can be achieved.
Moreover, if some predictability is lost, that is an acceptable price for
accomplishing major societal objectives. The approach I have offered
has the benefit of flexibility. It avoids the arbitrary loss of servitude
benefits from a flat twenty-year rule. It also allows the courts to police
inappropriate servitudes during the initial twenty-year period as well.
B. Actions of the Private Government
When administering and enforcing servitudes, a private government can exercise its discretion in a manner that violates the policy
and doctrinal bases supporting servitude enforcement. The governing
body can deny equal treatment or procedural fairness or act ultra vires
or irrationally. Such actions can exact tremendous costs from individuals, the community and the larger society.
1.

EQUAL TREATMENT AND FAIR PROCEDURES

A private government might treat similarly situated owners
unequally 75 or make decisions without following fair procedures 76 or
70. See Korngold, Servitudes and Defeasible Fees, supra note 10, at 571-72.
71. See, e.g., Wier v. Isenberg, 95 111. App. 3d 839, 842, 420 N.E.2d 790, 793 (1981);
Bob Layne Contractor, Inc. v. Buennagel, 158 Ind. App. 43, 53, 301 N.E.2d 671, 678 (1973);

Loeb v. Watkins, 428 Pa. 480, 484, 240 A.2d 513, 516 (1968).
72.

See Korngold, Single Family Covenants, supra note 11, at 978-79.

73. See, e.g., Blakely v. Gorin, 365 Mass. 590, 313 N.E.2d 903 (1974) (applying
MAss. GEN. LAws ArN. ch. 184 § 30); Holmes Harbor Water Co. v. Page, 8 Wash. App.
600, 508 P.2d 628 (1973) (citing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 941 (1939)).
74. See Winokur, supra note 11, at 77-78.

75. See, e.g., Garrison Apartments, Inc. v. Sabourin, 113 Misc. 2d 674, 449 N.Y.S.2d
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based on bias." This should not be permitted for both freedom of
contract and antirestrictions policy reasons. First, there are efficiency
concerns. When entering into a reciprocal restrictions scheme, parties
usually contemplate that each will bear the same burdens in exchange
for the same offsetting benefits. 78 When a private government treats

owners unevenly, it inappropriately rearranges the understanding. People will likely be less willing to buy property subject to servitude regimes

if this happens. Society and individuals will thus lose the efficiency
benefits of such arrangements.
Furthermore, many people in our society generally expect fair and
equal treatment in commercial dealings and expect decisions not based

on bias, perhaps as part of constitutional values. A person entering into
a servitude transaction likely has this expectation. 79 We can thus justify
servitude enforcement as a free choice and moral obligation of the
purchaser only if it includes a requirement of equal and fair treatment.
Additionally, the benefits of communal living and participatory democracy will be hard to achieve in an atmosphere of uneven treatment

and tainted decision making.
Finally, it is hard enough in the usual case to permit the limitation
of personal autonomy that servitudes bring. Given our social norms
of equality and procedural fairness, it seems unjustifiable, however, to

enforce servitudes that subject the present owner to unfair and unequal
dead hand control. This is particularly so in light of the important
property that is involved-the family home.
Therefore, in order to obtain the policy objectives of servitudes,

courts must supervise private governments' conduct to ensure equal
629 (Civ. Ct. 1982) (claim that cooperative rule requiring monthly charge for security or
tenant serving as guard in lieu of fee discriminated against elderly and infirm); Killearn Lakes
Homeowners Ass'n v. Sneller, 418 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (owner complained
of disproportionate impact from locating playground near his residence); see S. BARTON &
C. SILVERMAN, COMMON INTEREST HOMEOWNERS' AsSOCIATIONS MANAGEMENT STUDY 10,

22-23 (1987) (describing difficulty in allocating maintenance expenses among owners); RCA
Characteristicsand Issues, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 14 (describing unequal treatment in provision of services). For other examples of unequal treatment,
see infra note 80.
76. Defects may include failure to follow specified procedures, lack of notice and
opportunity to be heard, and flaws with the voting process. See S. BARTON & C. SILVERMAN,
supra note 75, at 11-12 (describing failure to follow procedures). See infra notes 83-84 and
accompanying text.
77. There may be conflicts of interest and fraud. See infra note 86 and accompanying
text.
78. If the documents clearly provide for unequal treatment of different classes of
owners, those differences should be upheld as a consensual arrangement, barring any collateral
attack on the agreement. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Hidden Valley Fishing Club, 743 S.W.2d
486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding different dues amounts among purchasers contained in
servitudes); Birchwood Lakes Community Ass'n v. Comis, 296 Pa. Super. 77, 442 A.2d 304
(1982) .(same).
79. La Esperanza Townhome Ass'n, Inc. v. Title Sec. Agency of Ariz., 142 Ariz.
235, 689 P.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1984). See supra note 78.
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treatment and fair procedures. Some courts have already begun to do
so. For example, amendments passed by the association on less-thanunanimous consent of the owners must apply uniformly to all residences.80 This would protect an individual owner's rights from being
reduced by the other owners. Thus, an owner does not have to accept
an amendment allowing her neighbor to build a store that will make
the neighbor's land more valuable and the other owners' shopping more
convenient, since the amendment will decrease the value of the owner's
residence. Additionally, the rule that requires governing bodies to apply
aesthetic controls fairly and reasonably also helps to prevent an owner
from being treated unfairly as compared to other owners. 81 Thus, a key
factor for many courts is whether the private government's decision
coincides with other residences and the plan of development.82
Some courts have also addressed process issues. They require that
express procedures in the servitudes must be followed.83 If no procedures are provided, the courts have required notice and an opportunity
to be heard.84 Courts mandate that decisions
be made in good faith85
86
bias.
impermissible
and will investigate for
80. See, e.g., Jaskiewicz v. Walton, 77 Md. App. 170, 549 A.2d 774 (1988) (amendment attempting to release only one lot from restriction was void); Ridge Park Home Owners
v. Pena, 88 N.M. 563, 544 P.2d 278 (1975) (amendment to allow only one lot to be used for
commercial purposes was void); see La Esperanza Townhome Ass'n, Inc. v. Title Sec. Agency
of Ariz., 142 Ariz. 235, 689 P.2d 178 (Ct. App. 1984); LaBrayere v. LaBrayere, 676 S.W.2d
522 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
81. See, e.g., Coral Gables Invs., Inc. v. Graham Cos., 528 So. 2d 989 (Fla. Ct. App.
1988); Town & Country Estates Ass'n v. Slater, 227 Mont. 489, 740 P.2d 668 (1987); Dodge
v. Carauna, 127 Wis. 2d 62, 377 N.W.2d 208 (Ct. App. 1985).
82. See, e.g., Smith v. Butler Mountain Estates Property Owners Ass'n, 90 N.C.
App. 40, 367 S.E.2d 401 (1988), afj'd, 324 N.C. 80, 375 S.E.2d 905 (1989) (geodesic home
out of character with neighboring houses); Town & Country Estates Ass'n v. Slater, 227 Mont.
489, 740 P.2d 668 (1987) (decision of board overruled by court since home was not discordant
with others); Ross v. Newman, 206 Neb. 42, 291 N.W.2d 228 (1980) (minor changes in design
which were similar to those which other owners made). See G. KORNGOLD, supra note 10,
at 368-72.
83. See, e.g., Ironwood Owners Ass'n IX v. Solomon, 178 Cal. App. 3d 766, 224
Cal. Rptr. 18 (1986) (board must comply with its own procedures in making decisions);
Johnson v. Keith, 368 Mass. 316, 331 N.E.2d 879 (1975) (under the governing documents,
declaration amendment, not a regulation, was required to effectuate the proposed change).
84. See, e.g., Ashelford v. Baltrusaitis, 600 S.W.2d 581 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (notice
of hearing on application and reasons for denial were required); Hanchett v. East Sunnyside
Civic League, 696 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (notice and opportunity to be heard
required before association amendment).
85. See, e.g., Cohen v. Kite Hill Community Ass'n, 142 Cal. App. 3d 642, 191 Cal.
Rptr. 209 (1983); Souza v. Columbia Park & Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 70 Md. App. 655, 522
A.2d 1376, cert. denied, 310 Md. 130, 527 A.2d 51(1987); Whiteco Metrocom, Inc. v. Industry
Properties Corp., 711 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
86. See, e.g., Souza v. Columbia Park & Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 70 Md. App. 655,
522 A.2d 1376, cert. denied, 310 Md. 130, 527 A.2d 51 (1987); Garrison Apartments, Inc. v.
Sabourin, 113 Misc. 2d 674, 449 N.Y.S.2d 629 (Civ. Ct. 1982). Courts will also investigate
whether signatures in vote were falsified or obtained by fraud. See, e.g., Windom v. Easley,
495 So. 2d 46 (Ala. 1986).
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Unfortunately, the courts have not clearly stated a theoretical or
doctrinal ground for imposing these obligations on private governments. Still, courts might explore several doctrinal bases. First, fair
treatment and procedures in servitude arrangements could be conceptualized as part of "good faith and fair dealing" generally required in
contracts.8 7 Second, the courts could examine more clearly the board
members' fiduciary duty to prevent bias.8" They could also utilize traditional servitude doctrines, such as estoppel, to prevent unfair behavior by the private government.8 9 Inequality of bargaining power and
consumer protection goals may also be invoked in some cases, especially if there is developer involvement. While the issues of equal treatment and fair procedures by associations parallel those of constitutional
law, these doctrines cannot be applied literally to private governments
because of a lack of state action. 90 However, the courts can use the
values inherent in these constitutional guarantees as analogies for pri91
vate governments.
Most important, the doctrinal rules developed by the courts must
reach a proper accommodation of the competing policy choices that I
have articulated. Only a policy-based rule of law can respond rationally
to the problems of private governments.
2.

ULTRA VIRES AND IRRATIONAL DECISIONS

Private governments might also impose restrictions that exceed
the body's power as granted in the servitudes. This offends several
policy considerations. Ultra vires decisions may destroy the efficiencies
of the servitude scheme, such as when a board allows outsiders to use
recreational facilities that the servitudes reserved for the sole use of
owners. 92 Moreover, since the owner did not consent to be bound in
this manner, freedom of contract notions require that such decisions
by the governing body be invalidated. The benefits of democratic par87. See A. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 526-28 (1982).
88. Only a few courts currently do that. See, e.g., Cohen v. Kite Hill Community
Ass'n, 142 Cal. App. 3d 642, 191 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1983); Thanasoulis v. Winston Tower 200
Ass'n, Inc., 214 N.J. Super. 408, 519 A.2d 911 (App. Div. 1986).
89. A few decisions use that theory. See, e.g., First Hyland Greens Ass'n v. Griffith,
618 P.2d 745 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980); but see Beaver Lake Ass'n v. Sorenson, 231 Neb. 75,
434 N.W.2d 703 (1989).
90. See Korngold, Single Family Covenants, supra note 10, at 974-75; Rosenberry,
The Application of the Federaland State Constitutions to Condominiums, Cooperatives and
Planned Developments, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. I (1984).
91. Even in some cases where governmental zoning creates unfair burdens, courts
often do not rely on the constitutional provision but rather employ a general rule of fair
treatment. See, e.g., Viso v. State, 92 Cal. App. 3d 15, 154 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1979) (spot zoning);
Jurgens v. Town of Huntington, 53 A.D.2d 661, 384 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)

(same).
92. See Bauer v. Ham, 223 Va. 31, 286 S.E.2d 192 (1982).

1990:513

Resolving the Flaws of Residential Servitudes

531

ticipation are also maximized by preventing a board from usurping
decision-making power specifically reserved to the membership at

large. 93 Additionally, courts should not permit associations to extend
the reach of the dead hand over individuals beyond what is stated in
the servitudes. 94 Judicial decisions restricting ultra vires acts by the
95
association or subgroup serve these policy goals.

Some owners may object to the wisdom of a decision made by
the private government. Although as a general rule decisions within
the association's power should be upheld, the courts should not enforce

decisions that cause inefficient land use-that is, those that reduce the
*community's welfare by imposing burdens on the community without
corresponding benefits. The difficult question, however, is the degree

of deference that the complaining owners and the reviewing court
should give to the private government's calculation of the costs and
benefits of its action. The courts have struggled with this issue. 96 Two
patterns of decisions have emerged, neither of which adequately recognizes the competing policies. One group of cases indicates that the
association cannot adopt rules that bear "no relationship to the health,
happiness, and enjoyment of life of the various unit owners." 97 This
is similar to the substantive due process test used by the courts in

reviewing zoning ordinances (although the substantive due process requirement is harder to meet on its face as it typically requires a substantialrelationship to a valid legislative goal). 98 If the courts in private
government cases follow the pattern of substantive due process deci-

sions, few if any regulations will fail to meet the test.99 Other courts
have reviewed association decisions under the business judgment rule,
requiring only a good faith exercise of decision-making power. 100 Some
93. See Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Rancho Santa Fe Ass'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 726, 223
Cal. Rptr. 175 (1986).
94. See Makeever v. Lyle, 125 Ariz. 384, 609 P.2d 1084 (Ct. App. 1980) (owner
cannot be deprived his right in common elements by board unless power granted by documents).
95. See, e.g., Wilson v. Goldman, 699 P.2d 420 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Johnson v.
Hobson, 505 A.2d 1313 (D.C. 1986); Killearn Lakes Homeowners Ass'n v. Sneller, 418 So.
2d 1214 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982). See G. KORNGOLD, supra note 10, at 372-75.
96. For an excellent discussion of this issue, see Note, Judicial Review of Condominium Rulemaking, 94 HARv. L. REV. 647 (1981)..
97. Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Ct. App.
1975). Accord Johnson v. Hobson, 505 A.2d 1313 (D.C. 1986); Ryan v. Baptiste, 565 S.W.2d
196 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Garrison Apartments, Inc. v. Sabourin, 113 Misc. 2d 674, 449
N.Y.S.2d 629 (Civ. Ct. 1982); Justice Court Mut. Hous. Coop., Inc. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d
541, 270 N.Y.S.2d 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
98. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
99. See Stratford v. State-House, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D. Ky. 1982).
100. See, e.g., Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo. App. 334, 526 P.2d 316 (1974);
Thanasoulis v. Winston Tower 200 Ass'n, 214 N.J. Super. 408, 519 A.2d 911 (App. Div.
1986); Linden Hill No. 3 Coop. Corp. v. Berkman, 61 Misc. 2d 275, 305 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1969); see Note, supra note 96, at 663-67.
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have noted that the business judgment test as currently constituted
0
adds little protection.'1
The courts need to examine more clearly the standards for review
of private government decisions in light of the competing policies. In
addition to the usual reasons for deference-for example, the expertise
of the private government compared to the courts and the prohibitive
cost of reviewing all determinations-the policies underlying servitude
enforcement require that courts exhibit great caution before imposing
their judgment. The private government should be sustained in all but
the most extraordinary cases, because the efficiencies of delegating decisions to a private government should not be undermined, the owners'
free choice to enter into a community relationship should be respected,
and the democratic participatory process of the private government
should be supported by the courts. The courts should override only
those judgments that are clearly irrational, on the theory that such
grossly unreasonable and inefficient decisions violate the legitimate ex02
pectations of a purchaser.
Although this would limit challenges claiming that the community's cost/benefit decision is incorrect, an individual is not left without
protection. As discussed above, decisions could be challenged because
of unequal treatment, lack of process and excessive dead hand control.10 3 Such a scheme strikes an appropriate balance between communal goals and individual rights.
Decisions by private governments, therefore, may be detrimental
to the extent that they lack process, permit unequal treatment of owners,
are ultra vires or are wholly irrational. These problems, however, do
not require the arbitrary termination of servitudes after twenty years.
Such a step would not, on the one hand, alleviate the problems that
arise during the initial twenty-year period and, on the other hand, it
would terminate beneficial servitudes prematurely. Courts can develop
doctrines to address the specific problems with servitude enforcement
by private associations if courts more clearly address and accommodate
competing policies.
101. See Thanasoulis v. Winston Tower 200 Ass'n, 214 N.J. Super. 408, 412, 519
A.2d 911, 913 (App. Div. 1986) (dissenting opinion).
102. The decision in Justice Court Mut. Hous. Coop., Inc. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d
541, 270 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1966), was such a restriction. A rule limiting the playing of musical
instruments by any individual to one and one-half hours a day was too roughly drawn to
address legitimate noise problems and merely put a burden on the owners.

103. The courts' role might especially be limited when the private government's
action is legislative in nature, applying to the larger community, as opposed to quasi-judicial,
dealing with one particular owner. See Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Or. 574,
507 P.2d 23 (1973) (requiring increased judicial scrutiny of local legislature's quasi-judicial
zoning decisions).
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C. Methods of Dispute Resolution
Disputes over servitudes administered by a private government
can involve different parties and a wide variety of issues. The association can have a grievance with an individual owner, such as a failure
to pay assessments or violation of a servitude or rule; 104 an owner can
object to the association's action, for example, the denial of approval
of architectural plans or failure to provide services; 0 5 or two owners
06
can be in conflict over alleged anti-social behavior, such as noise.'
As I have indicated earlier, we should not be alarmed by such disputes.
Rather, we should consider how to resolve efficiently such conflicts in
ways that preserve individual autonomy and reinforce the communal
structure. Over recent years alternate dispute resolution devices have
grown. Now a wide array of choices exist, ranging from negotiation
between the parties to mediation to binding arbitration to formal adjudication.I 7 We need to explore further using alternate techniques to
resolve conflicts within private governments.
In determining the best method for solving a given dispute, the
particular disputants, issues, and underlying goals must be considered.
In addition to the efficiency and low cost of alternate dispute resolution,10 8 the ongoing relationship among owners and the association
may make negotiation and mediation preferable to adjudication. 0 9 The
parties to a servitude scheme have a stake in preserving a continuing,
cooperative relationship and avoiding bitter and protracted litigation.
Nonadjudicatory resolution might reinforce ties and reconciliation
among neighbors. 10o It might be especially helpful when the conflict's
cause is due more to social antagonisms among neighbors than to a
justiciable legal issue.
Moreover, many subdivision disputes are "polycentric," where
104. See S. BARTON & C. SILVERMAN, supra note 75, at 20-22, 23-27.
105. See RCA CharacteristicsandIssues, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra
note 3, at 10.
106. The association may often become involved in such a dispute by prosecuting

the violating owner under an existing rule or by passing a new regulation of the behavior.
See Justice Court Mut. Hous. Coop., Inc. v. Sandow, 50 Misc. 2d. 541, 270 N.Y.S.2d 829

(1966).
107.

For a description of these choices, see S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN, & F. SANDER,

DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7-10 (1985); S. LEESON & B. JOHNSTON, ENDING IT: DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA (1988); McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity

ofAdjudication on Litigating Lawyers, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 833 (1990); Ray, Condominium

Disputes: Fitting the Forum to the Fuss, 3 PRoB. & PROP. 20 (1989).
108.

See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN, & F. SANDER, supra note 107, at 5.

109. See id. at 10-11; Sander, Varieties ofDispute Processing,70 F.R.D. 111, 118-26
(1976).
110. See S. LEESON & B. JOHNSTON, supra note 107, at 149; McThenia & Shaffer,
For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1664, 1667 (1985); Shonholtz, NeighborhoodJustice
Systems: Work Structure, and Guiding Principles, 5 MEDIATION Q. 3, 13-16 (1984).
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resolution of a dispute will affect many others and where there is no
clear definition of rights. ' II Consider, for example, an owner challenging a private government's rejection of building plans under a covenant
calling for architectural review. The issue's resolution will affect the
rest of the community (by allowing or barring the alleged "eyesore").
Additionally, the legal rule is quite flexible, only requiring fair and
reasonable application of the standard 1 2 and consistency with other
houses." 3 Formal adjudication may not be most helpful in such situations. 14

Professor Sally Engle Merry has argued that alternate dispute resolution devices cannot be imposed without considering the culture's
view of how disputes should be resolved."I 5 She maintains that many
Americans resist alternate dispute resolution because of "Americans'
widespread cultural conceptions of legal solutions to problems." 1 6 She
notes that "when disputants are bound together by multi-stranded social relationships, they will seek to compromise their differences, but
when they have only single-stranded social ties, they will seek victory
in adversarial contests rather than attempt to reach compromise." 117
The special economic, social and physical interdependence of owners
within private governments may create a subculture of multi-stranded
relationships where alternate dispute resolution is a viable and valuable
option.
On the other hand, alternate dispute resolution may not be appropriate in some private government disputes. Formal adjudication
may be necessary where some issues are novel or important." ' This
may especially be true if there is an unequal power relationship between
the disputants, 1 9 which may be the case when the community seeks
enforcement against an individual. Consider, for example, an association trying to enforce a rule restricting occupancy to a "traditional"
single family. ' 2 Such an important issue of personal autonomy requires
clear judicial resolution, especially since a nonconformist standing
(1978).

Ill.
112.

Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-404

See, e.g., Amoco Realty Co. v. Montalbano,
133 Ill. App. 3d 327, 478 N.E.2d
860 (1985); Gosnay v. Big Sky Owners Ass'n, 205 Mont. 221, 666 P.2d 1247 (1983).
113. See, e.g., Rhue v. Cheyenne Homes, Inc., 168 Colo. 6, 449 P.2d 361 (1969);
Marose v. Deves, 697 S.W.2d 279 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
114. See Fuller, supra note 111, at 394-404.
115. Merry, Disputing Without Culture (Book Review), 100 HARV. L. REV. 2057,
2060, 2062 (1987).
116. Id. at 2062.
117. Id. at 2061.
118. See Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669 (1985); Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
119. See Fiss, Out of Eden, supra note 118.
120. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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alone may be unable to reach satisfactory results through negotiation
and mediation.
Alternate dispute resolution has been used to a limited extent in
residential associations. 12 1 One study shows that a very large percentage
of disputants within condominiums were willing to submit the controversy to arbitration or mediation. 12 2 We need to continue to study the
types of conflicts and disputants within servitude regimes and develop
appropriate dispute resolution schemes that can be required by the
servitude documents or imposed by the courts.
IV. CONCLUSION

As we near the end of the twentieth century, servitude regimes
and private residential governments can be employed to bring many
benefits to homeowners. Less developable land is available, city and
suburban sprawl tests our transportation resources, interdependence of
landowners has increased with geographical proximity, and the environmental fallout of poorly planned development is magnified. Servitude regimes and private governments permit efficiencies, free choice,
self-fulfillment and communal participation. However, there are costs
to individuals and society. We need to address these problems and
develop solutions in a way that preserves, not terminates, the benefits
of servitudes.

121.
RELATIONS,

See S. BARTON & C. SILVERMAN, supra note 75, at 23; INTERGOVERNMENTAL

supra note 3, at 5, 19; S. WILLIAMSON & R.

ADAMS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN

CONDOMINIUMS: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF CONDOMINIUM OWNERS IN THE STATE OF

FLORIDA (Human Resources Management Center, College of Business Administration, University of North Florida 1987); see generally Ray, supra note 107.
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